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Abstract
Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the
initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speci¯cation in public pro-
curement and provides a rationale for design misspeci¯cation. We propose a model in which the
sponsor decides how much to invest in design speci¯cation and awards competitively the project
to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegoti-
ation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that
new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally
di®erentiated contractors, the design's speci¯cation level is seen to a®ect the resulting degree of
competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design spec-
i¯cation and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive
market supply, is to underinvest in design speci¯cation so as to make signi¯cant cost overruns
likely. Since no such misspeci¯cation occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are
seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
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i\Lady Brandon treats her guests exactly as an auctioneer treats his objects. She either explains
them entirely away, or tells one everything about them except what one wants to know" Oscar
Wilde (1891) The Picture of Dorian Gray, reprint in Penguin Books, London, 1994, p. 14.
1 Introduction
Horror stories about public works projects frequently appear in the press. Most of the cases
that catch the attention of the public eye are characterized by long delays and huge cost overruns,
usually associated with changes of the initial design of the projects.1 Accusations against the
procuring agencies are focused on the issue of poor initial design. Agencies are portrayed as
incompetent, or in some cases as corrupt, for not paying enough attention to the speci¯cation
of projects before procuring them, thus resulting in renegotiation with the contractor over the
projects.
This paper proposes a rationale behind this observed pattern. We show that it is in the interest
of the procurer to underinvest in design speci¯cation. The intuition behind this result is that,
by reducing the design speci¯cation, the sponsor reduces the comparative advantage of the most
e±cient ¯rm in the awarding process. By making ¯rms more homogeneous the sponsor intensi¯es
competition and this results in a lower transfer. We also show that the more competitive the
market, the better speci¯ed the initial design will be. In particular, in a perfectly competitive
market, in which ¯rms earn no rents, no design misspeci¯cation takes place.
The main goal of the paper is to use the analysis of the speci¯cation design problem to
study the cost overruns in public works. We ¯nd that cost overruns are decreasing in the design
speci¯cation level. Then, using the relationship between competitiveness and incentives to design
speci¯cation, we show that when the procurement market is more competitive cost overruns are
lower. For this reason, cost overruns are argued to be a consequence of the lack of competition in
the procurement market.
1The Boston harbor tunnel in Boston, USA, and the new subway system in Athens, Greece, are two archetypical
examples of public projects plagued with such problems.
1We study a simple procurement problem in which a sponsor wants to undertake a single
project. There exists a ¯xed number of horizontally di®erentiated potential contractors. Prior
to the awarding process, the sponsor decides how much to invest
t) and this decision becomes public information. As a result of this learning process
an initial design is speci¯ed. The
ormation about the optimal design is generated, and the awarded contractor
and the sponsor engage in a bilateral renegotiation to change the initial design to accommodate
the new information. Cost overruns, i.e., the di®erence between the ¯nal price and the price
announced once the project is initially awarded, are a consequence of this renegotiation. As
often claimed, a low investment in the initial design speci¯cation is likely to lead to negotiating
signi¯cant changes and therefore to high cost overruns.2
Potential contractors in the procurement market are horizontally specialized in a speci¯c
design. As a consequence of this, the higher the investment in design speci¯cation, the higher the
advantage of the contractor located closest to the initial design, and the larger its rents. From
a di®erent point of view, however, the higher the investment in initial design speci¯cation, the
higher the probability that the awarded contractor will be the most e±cient one, in the sense
that the probability that the awarded contractor will be the closest to the ¯nal project design is
higher. For this reason, when the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speci¯cation, he
has to trade o® optimally the reduction of procurement rents with the increase of the probability
of choosing the most e±cient ¯rm.
This article is related to three di®erent branches of the literature. First, the paper relates to
the literature concerning to explain the cost overruns in public works. Lewis (1986) and Arvan and
Leite (1989) study a framework in which: (a) procurement occurs over an extended period, (b) the
sponsor and the contractor cannot credibly commit themselves to a long-term contract, (c) the
2Ganuza (1997), an empirical study of cost overruns in public works in Spain, tries to identify the magnitude
and causes of cost overruns in larger public works. The largest 256 public work projects undertaken by the Spanish
Administration during two years led to cost overruns 77 % of the cases, average cost overruns were 22 % of budgeted
costs and 62,7% of cost overruns cases were related to changes in the projects' design during construction.
2contractor has better information about the cost of completing the project, and (d) most bene¯ts
accrue-to the sponsor only after the project is completed. In this framework cost overruns occur
because the opportunity cost of giving up the project increases. The price of each task depends on
the credible threat of stopping the project. This threat is less credible for the later tasks that for
the earlier ones. Thus the price that the sponsor pays increases over time, even when the expected
cost of the all stages is the same. In the present model there is only one construction stage and,
hence, we do not have this dynamic e®ect. Gaspar and Leite (1989) present a model in which
the procurement mechanism induces an ex post downward bias on project cost and consequently
cost overruns. In their model, the sponsor has to choose between n potential contractors after
receiving a signal about the real cost of the project for each contractor. This signal is the sum of
the idiosyncratic cost of the ¯rm and a measurement error. The ¯rm with the lowest signal is the
¯rm with the lowest expected cost. In addition, the expected measurement error for this ¯rm is
negative, leading to underestimation of the true cost, and cost overruns. We are not considering
this sort of cost uncertainty, and, hence, do not study this e®ect in our model.
The present work can also be regarded as a contribution to the literature that tries to endog-
enize the information structure in principal-agent relationships. In particular, the paper touches
upon a line of research that investigates the strategic bene¯ts of ignorance in principal agents
problems. Cremer (1995) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show how it can be in the interest
of the principal to remain uninformed if the initial contract can be renegotiated. Ignorance in
these models serves as a commitment device, because the principal wants to avoid taking actions
in the renegotiation stage that can a®ect the incentives of the agent in the initial stage. Our
contribution to this literature is to study the e®ect of the strategic ignorance of the sponsor in the
procurement problem and to show how this strategic ignorance can lead to stronger competition
among ¯rms.
In terms of modeling choices our paper is closely related to Lewis and Sappington (1994)
who focus on information acquisition by consumers in a monopoly market. The authors examine
whether the monopolist should allow the consumers to acquire information about their tastes for
3his product. Improved private information enables the monopolist to charge higher prices to high-
value buyers, but can also provide rents to the buyers. Most of their results are extreme, in the
sense that the monopolist decides to provide all the information or none. Aside from di®erences
in the information structures analyzed, our paper di®ers from Lewis and Sappington in that we
analyze an procurement problem in which the price is set by an auction mechanism. In the same
line of research, Bergemann and VÄ alimaki (1997) study information acquisition by consumers
in a duopolistic market in which one ¯rm introduces a new product, whose value is learned by
consumers through experimentation. The authors show that in equilibrium, the sales path of the
new product induces levels of experimentation that di®er from the e±cient ones. The intuition is
that both ¯rms want to speed up the learning process in the early stages in order to obtain rents
due to product di®erentiation. In this paper, the sponsor induces a suboptimal learning process
to reduce ¯rms' di®erentiation and consequently ¯rms' rents.
Finally, this paper can also be related to the literature that studies the hold-up problem in
contract theory.3 This literature show that under incomplete contracting, when two parties need
to invest before contracting, there can be underinvestment. This is due to the fact the parties
can not appropriate the full bene¯ts of an increase in their investment. Although we study a very
speci¯c framework, our main result seems to be close to this underinvestment result. In fact, the
underinvestment in speci¯cation design comes from the fact that the sponsor cannot capture the
full bene¯t of e±cient matching. As will become clear later on, our result is, however, driven by a
di®erent cause: the renegotiation of the contract, which is crucial in the literature mentioned above
is not relevant in our setting since the incumbent rents are discounted by potential contractors in
the auction. In our case, the underinvestment result is due to the following e®ect: the more the
sponsor invests in design speci¯cation, the more e±cient is the matching (the larger is the total
surplus), but the larger are the rents captured by the ¯rms at the auction stage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced while
section 3 characterizes the e±cient solution. Section 4 solves the model and presents the main
3See for example, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) or Hart and Moore (1994).
4results of the paper. In Section 5 we brie°y consider the case in which the ¯rms cannot observe
the design speci¯cation level. Section 6 discusses the scope and implications of the model and
presents conclusions. All proofs are all relegated to a technical appendix.
2 The model
Consider a sponsor that plans to undertake a project. The payo® to the sponsor depends on
the project's design d 2 D; where the design space D is a circle of perimeter one. Let d¤ 2 D
denote the optimal design for the sponsor and assume that the payo® to the sponsor from a project
d 2 D is V (d) = V ¡ (d ¡ d¤)2, where V is a given real number, so that the payo® is decreasing
in the distance between d and d¤. The sponsor is initially uncertain about the exact location of
the optimal design so that ex ante, d¤ is distributed according to the uniform distribution on the
design space.
There are N risk-neutral potential contractors i = f1;:::;Ng. The location of each potential
contractor di is uniformly distributed on the circle D. Each potential contractor specializes in one
design, its location di 2 D, and its cost of completing an arbitrary design d is Ci(d) = C+¯(d¡di)2;
where ¯ is meant to capture the specialization level in the contractors' market.
We assume that the sponsor has to take two decisions related to the project design. In a
speci¯cation stage, before contracting, the sponsor conducts research on the location of d¤, and
speci¯es an initial design, denoted by b d by choosing a speci¯cation investment ± 2 [0;1) ; the
way in which the stochastic relationship between b d and d¤ depends on ± is detailed below. Given
b d, the sponsor awards the project competitively to a potential contractor. During the realization
of the project, new information about the optimal design arises and the sponsor may renegotiate
the initial contract b d with the awarded contractor.
The initial design is partially correlated with the optimal design, in particular we assume it






according with the distribution function G("j±). We make the following assumptions about this
distribution:
5Assumption 1 The density function associated to G("j±) is symmetric and centered at 0:
Assumption 2 When ± = 0, G("j±) is equal to the uniform distribution on [¡1
2; 1
2]. When
± ! 1, G("j±) converges to the Dirac delta function on 0 :
G("j1) =
(
1 if e ¸ 0
0 otherwise
Assumption 3 G("j±) is di®erentiable and decreasing in ± for all " lower than 0,
@G("j±)
@± < 0 for
all " 2 (¡1
2;0), and G("j±) is di®erentiable and increasing in ± for all " greater than 0,
@G("j±)
@± > 0
for all " 2 (0; 1
2).4
[Figure 1 around here]
Given these assumptions b d is also distributed uniformly around the circle, and by assumption
1 it is an unbiased estimator of the optimal design. Assumption 2 implies that when ± = 0 the
initial design is not correlated with the optimal design, whereas when ± = 1 the initial design
coincides with the optimal design. Assumption 3 implies that the variance of the noise decreases
with ±.5 Therefore, the greater the speci¯cation investment (the larger ±), the closer is in expected
terms the initial design of the optimal one.
After the initial design has been speci¯ed and the speci¯cation level has become public infor-
mation, the awarding process takes place. Notice that once the bidders observe b d, the distribution




2]; when the underliying normal distribution
has mean ¹ = 0 and variance ¾ = 1













5An alternative assumption to Assumption 3 might be:
Assumption 3
0 If ± > ±
0 , we can order the distribution functions G("j±) and G("j±
0) in the sense of ¯rst order
stochastic dominance: G("j±) ￿ G("j±
0) 8" 2 [¡
1
2;0], G("j±) ¸ G("j±
0) 8" 2 [0;
1
2]:
An example of a distribution that is consistent with this new assumption is the uniform distribution on an interval









0 if " < ¡ 1
2(1+±)
(1 + ±)" + 1
2 if " 2 [¡ 1
2(1+±); 1
2(1+±)]
1 if " >
1
2(1+±)
Under this alternative assumption, using the techniques of Milgrom and Shanon (1994), we would obtain the same
monotone comparative results. However, Assumption 3 allows us to obtain strictly monotonic results.
6of d¤ is no longer uniform. d¤ is then distributed on the circle according to a posterior distribu-
tion F(dj±) depending on the initial b d and the speci¯cation level ±.6Firms using F(dj±) update
their believes over the optimal design and submit their o®ers to the sponsor. All ¯rms know the
locations of their competitors and this information is veri¯able by the sponsor.7 The sponsor
awards the public work to the most convenient ¯rm (taking into account its bid and its location
technology). The winning ¯rm signs a contract to undertake the initial design. 8 During the
construction of the project, the sponsor and the ¯rm learn the optimal design, and change the
initial contract using bilateral renegotiation that is represented by a Nash Bargaining procedure.
The sponsor's preferences over ¯nal outcomes are represented by the following utility function
US = V (d) ¡ p ¡ ±; where V (d) is valuation of the project and p is the project's price. We want
to characterize the sponsor's optimal investment in design speci¯cation, taking into account how
this investment is going to a®ect the result of the auction process (the winning ¯rm and the
procurement price) as well as the contract's renegotiation. Summarizing, the time sequence of
the model is as follows:
1. The sponsor, knowing the number of ¯rms in the market, N, decides his expenditures on
research, ±; and speci¯es an initial design b d for the project. The speci¯cation level ± becomes
6For notational convenience, we take the location of the public signal as the origin of the circle, and we de¯ne




2]. Given the above assumptions over the noise distribution, F(dj±) presents the
following characteristics: (i) The density function associated to F(dj±) is symmetric and centered at b d: (ii) When
± = 0, F(dj±) is equal to the uniform distribution on [ b d ¡
1
2; b d +
1
2]. When ± ! 1, F(dj±) converges to the Dirac
delta function on b d (iii) F(dj±) is decreasing in ± for all d lower than b d and increasing in ± for all d greater than b d .
7Therefore, ¯rms compete in the procurement process like in standard Bertrand competition among heterogenous
¯rms. The purpose of looking at such simpli¯ed setting is to avoid unnecessary complications in the presentation.
We can show that introducing the assumption of asymmetric information over the ¯rm's location does not change
the results of the model as long as we do not consider contracts over realizations of d
¤: If d
¤ is contractible we
can commit to ine±cient ex-post renegotiations of the optimal design in order to reduce the informational rents
(See for example Che (1993)). We are assuming that d
¤ is not contractible and therefore we are not exploring this
problem. However, our conjecture, is that the main results of the paper would still remain when d
¤ is contractible.
Commiting to ine±cient renegotiation of the contract and misspecifying the initial design are two ways to reduce
¯rm rents, and we expect the sponsor would use both of them, if he could.
8Notice that procuring b d is a optimal strategy for the sponsor. He can not increase his pro¯ts by procuring
another design since he does not know ex-ante the location of the ¯rms and the ¯rms are located according to
a uniform distribution. In a related paper Ganuza and Pechivanos (1999) study a model in which the location of
the ¯rms and the optimal design are public knowledge (and there is no design renegotiation). In this model the
optimal strategy for the sponsor is to procure a design di®erent to the optimal one (between the optimal design and
the location of the most disadvantaged ¯rm), since by doing that he increases ¯rm competition in the procurement
process.
7public information.9
2. The sponsor announces the initial design. Firms learn their location (with respect to b d) and
present their bids to the sponsor. The sponsor awards the public project to the ¯rm that
maximizes his expected utility considering its bids and its location technology.
3. The winning ¯rm and the sponsor learn the optimal design d¤ and, through a Nash bargain-
ing procedure, decide the ¯nal design and the ¯nal price to be paid for the project.10
In the next section we study the benchmark case by characterizing the e±cient solution.
Section 4 provides the solution of the model.
3 Efficient solution
In this section, we consider the problem of a social planner, who chooses the design speci¯cation
level ±E, the winning ¯rm dw, and the ¯nal design dE that maximize total surplus (the sum of
sponsor's utility and the pro¯ts of the winning ¯rm), W = EfUS +¼wg = EfV (d)¡Cw(d)¡±g:
In maximizing total surplus the planner faces the same informational constraints as the sponsor
so that the timing of the e±cient procurement process can be described as follows:
1. Given the number of ¯rms in the market, N, the social planner decides research expenditure
± and speci¯es an initial design b d for the project.
2. Given b d, the social planner learns the location of the ¯rms and chooses the winning ¯rm.
3. In the course of the construction of the project, the social planner learns the optimal design.
Given the location of the winning ¯rm and the optimal design, the social planner chooses a
¯nal design for the project.
9In Section 5, we relax the assumption of perfect information and we consider the case in which ¯rms cannot
observe the level of design speci¯cation.
10This model tries to capture the institutional framework which is used by public administrations to procure
large public works. See Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000) and Ganuza (1997) for description of the American and
Spanish case, respectively.
8We solve the model using backwards induction. The next subsection characterizes the ¯nal
design given the winning ¯rm and the optimal design. Subsection 3.2 will then select the optimal
¯rm to undertake the project given the initial design, the locations of the ¯rms and the design
speci¯cation level. Lastly, subsection 3.3 studies the sponsor problem and provides the e±cient
design speci¯cation level.
3.1 Final design
In the construction stage, when the social planner learns the optimal design d¤, he chooses
the ¯nal design of the project given this optimal design and the location of the winning ¯rm dw.
Let dE be the optimal ¯nal design which maximizes the total surplus of the project.
dE 2 argmax
d
V (d) ¡ Cw(d)





The optimal ¯nal design turns out to be an average between the location of the awarded ¯rm
and the optimal project design. The weight of the ¯rm's location in the average depends on the
technological parameter ¯. In particular, the larger the specialization of the market (the larger ¯)
the closer is the ¯nal design to the location of the awarded ¯rm. Notice that when ¯ = 0, the case
of homogenous ¯rms, the cost does not depend on the design and the ¯nal design is the optimal
one. On the contrary, when ¯ = 1, ¯rms can only produce one design, and the ¯nal design is
trivially the location of the winning ¯rm.
3.2 The most e±cient ¯rm
In the awarding process the social planner has to choose a ¯rm after learning all ¯rms' locations,
dw, i 2 f1;::: ;Ng. Given dE, the expected surplus of the project depends on the location of
the winning ¯rm and on the speci¯cation level of the initial design. Let S(di;±) be the expected
9surplus of the project if it assigned to a ¯rm with location di when the design speci¯cation level
is ±
S(di;±) = Ed¤fV (dE) ¡Ci(dE)j±g:
The following lemma shows how the expected surplus of the project depends on the ¯rm's location.
Lemma 1 If ± > 0; then the expected surplus is decreasing in the distance between the initial
design and the location of the ¯rm. If ± = 0; then the expected surplus does not depend on the
distance between the initial design and the location of the ¯rms:
Let d1 be the closest location to the initial design b d: Then an immediate corollary of the
previous Lemma characterizes the ¯rm that maximizes the expected surplus.
Corollary 1 The e±cient winning ¯rm is the closest ¯rm to the initial design dw = d1.
The intuition behind this result is the following. The expected surplus of the project will
depend on the distance between the winning ¯rm and the optimal design. Since the initial design
is an unbiased estimator of the optimal design, the closest ¯rm to the initial design is (in expected
terms) the closest ¯rm to the optimal one. Hence, the closest ¯rm is the most e±cient ¯rm ex-
ante. On the other hand, if the social planner does not invest in design speci¯cation, the optimal
design can be with the same probability on any arbitrary place in the circle, implying that the
expected surplus of any ¯rm is the same. Notice, that the ¯rm with location d1 may turn out to
be not the most e±cient ¯rm ex-post and that the probability of this event is decreasing in the
design speci¯cation.11
3.3 Optimal design speci¯cation
In the speci¯cation stage, the social planner has to choose the investment in design speci¯cation
knowing the number of ¯rms. The expected surplus of the project is now only a function of the
11We do not consider the possibility of replacing the incumbent ¯rm. As a matter of fact, the main results do not




The next result characterizes the relationship between the expected surplus of the project and
the speci¯cation level of the design.
Lemma 2 The expected surplus of the project is increasing in the speci¯cation level of design, ±.
Lemma 2 rests on the fact that the larger is the investment in the project design speci¯ca-
tion, the better is the matching between the technology of the winning ¯rm and the sponsor's
preferences.
Given the above, the social planner has to choose the investment in design speci¯cation trading
o® increases in the expected surplus of the project against the cost of specifying the initial project.
The optimal speci¯cation design level is the solution to this problem
±E 2 argmax
±
Ed1fS(d1;±) ¡ ±g: (1)
First observe that given that S(d1;±) is bounded above, ±E has to be ¯nite. In the following
we will assume that ±E > 0; an assumption which is justi¯ed if the cost of providing very basic
information about the optimal design is su±ciently small. Then, we have:
Proposition 1 The optimal design speci¯cation level ±E is increasing in the number of ¯rms N
and the technological parameter ¯:
The total procurement surplus depends on the distance between the location of the awarded
¯rm and the optimal design. When the number of ¯rms increases, the expected distance between
the initial design and the awarded ¯rm decreases, with the implication that the incentives to make
this initial design closer to the optimal one also increase. Following a similar argument, if the
technological parameter ¯ increases, the incentives to reduce the distance between the awarded
¯rm and the optimal design also increases (the match between the sponsor's preferences and the
contractor's technology becomes most important). The only way for the sponsor to ensure an
11appropriate match is to reduce the distance between the optimal design and the initial one and
this in turn can only be accomplished by increasing the investment in design speci¯cation.12
4 Competitive Solution
We solve the model using backwards induction. The next subsection characterizes the solution
of the design's renegotiation. Subsection 4.2 provides the result of the competitive mechanism.
Subsection 4.3 concludes the analysis of the model by studying what is the optimal design speci-
¯cation level.
4.1 Renegotiation of the initial design
When the awarded contractor and the sponsor learn the optimal design, they bargain over the
¯nal design dC and the ¯nal price of the project pF. At this renegotiation stage they know the
initial design b d, the procurement price pp, and the location of the winning ¯rm dw . We assume that
the outcome of the bargaining process is the solution of a generalized Nash bargaining problem.13
Let ¼S(dC;pF) denote the agreement payo® to the sponsor when the ¯nal design is dC and the
¯nal price pF and ½S( b d;pp) his disagreement point. Let ¼F(dC;pF) denote the agreement payo®
to the winning ¯rm and ½F( b d;pp) its disagreement point. The ¯nal design dC and ¯nal price pF
will then be given by the solution to the following problem:
max
dC; pF
(¼S ¡ ½S)1¡®(¼F ¡ ½F)®:
Where ® is the ¯rm's bargaining power. Payo® functions are de¯ned as follows. The sponsor's
¯nal surplus is the utility of the ¯nal design minus the new price and the investment in design
speci¯cation, ¼S(dC;pF) = V ¡ (dC ¡ d¤)2 ¡ pF ¡ ± and his disagreement point is given by the
12Notice that we did not impose assumptions on the convexity of the problem and therefore we cannot guarantee
that the sponsor's problem is concave. We use the techniques of Edlin and Shannon (1998), that allow us to get
comparative static results in non convex problems, as long as the cross derivatives' conditions are globally satis¯ed
by the problem, a condition that is satis¯ed in our case.
13Notice that in contrast with other models, the assumption of Nash bargaining is not important in our model,
since the negotiation rents of the awarded contractor are discounted in the auction. Di®erent bargaining procedures
can be shown to lead to the same results.
12utility of the initial design minus the procurement price and the investment in design speci¯cation,
½S( b d;pp) = V ¡( b d¡d¤)2¡pp¡±. The awarded ¯rm's ¯nal pro¯t is the new price minus the cost
of the new design, ¼F(dC;pF) = pF ¡C ¡¯(dC ¡dw)2. Its disagreement point is the procurement
price minus the cost of the initial design, ½F( b d;pp) = pp ¡ C ¡ ¯( b d ¡ dw)2. Given these payo®
functions, the Nash bargaining problem can be rewritten as follows
max
dC;pF
(¡(dC ¡ d¤)2 ¡ pF + (b d ¡ d¤)2 + pp)®
³
pF ¡ ¯(dC ¡dw)2 ¡ pp +¯(b d ¡dw)2
´1¡®
and its solution is characterized in the next lemma.




pF = pp + ¯(dC ¡ dw)2 ¡ ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
+®
³
¡(dC ¡ d¤)2 + (b d ¡d¤)2 ¡ ¯(dC ¡ dw)2 + ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
´
:
We are assuming that in this stage the sponsor and the ¯rm both learn the optimal design. It is
easy to check that as long as the sponsor knows the location of the awarded ¯rm, this assumption
is not necessary. Suppose that only the awarded ¯rm learns the optimal design and it has to
report it to the sponsor. The ¯rm will report the design that maximizes its expected rents, but
given the result of the renegotiation, the expected rents are ®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F), and the design
that maximizes these rents is the optimal design.
Since the bargaining procedure is e±cient, we obtain the same ¯nal design as in the e±cient
solution dC = dE. The ¯nal price can be seen to be equal to the procurement price, plus the cost
to change from the initial design to the ¯nal one, plus a proportion ® (bargaining power) of the
surplus generated by the bargaining process: pF = pp+Cw(dC)¡Cw( b d)+®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F):
4.2 Price Competition
Procurement proceeds in three steps. First, ¯rms observe ± and b d and learn their location
with respect to b d. Second, each ¯rm submits a bid, a location-price pair. Third, the sponsor,
13taking into account the location of the ¯rms and the price, awards the project to the ¯rm that
submitted the bid that maximizes its expected utility US. The next proposition characterizes the
solution at the procurement stage.
Lemma 4 The closest ¯rm wins the auction dw = d1, and the procurement price is
pp = C1(b d) ¡ Ed¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)j±g +S(d1;±) ¡ S(d2;±);
where d1 is the closest ¯rm to the initial design and d2 is the second closest ¯rm.
The procurement price has three components: the cost of the initial project, the expected
rents from future renegotiation (which are discounted), and the winning ¯rm's expected pro¯t
S(d1;±) ¡ S(d2;±).
Proposition 2 The expected pro¯t of the winning ¯rm is increasing in the speci¯cation level of
the design ±.
This is an important result for the paper: The higher is the speci¯cation level of the design,
the higher is the market power of the winning ¯rm, because the ¯rm's location becomes more
important. The implication of this result is that the sponsor can use the speci¯cation level of the
design to control ¯rms' rents.
4.3 Initial design optimal speci¯cation
The sponsor has to ¯nd the speci¯cation of initial design that maximizes its expected surplus





Ed1;d2;d¤fV (dC) ¡ pF ¡ ±g
Substituting the expression of the ¯nal price into the expected surplus we obtain
US = Ed1;d2;d¤fV (dC) ¡ pp + Cw(dC) ¡ Cw(b d) + ®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)g ¡ ±:
14and substituting the expected procurement price into this expression and simplifying we obtain
US = Ed1;d¤fV (dC) ¡C1(dC)g + Ed1;d2f¡S(d1;±) + S(d2;±)g ¡±:
Since Ed1;d¤fV (dC) ¡ C1(dC)g = Ed1fS(d1;±)g, we ¯nally obtain that
US = Ed2 fS(d2;±) ¡ ±g




Comparing this expression to 1 it is easy to see that the expected surplus of the sponsor does not
depend on the location of the ¯rm closest to the initial design, i.e., the winning ¯rm (as is the
case in the e±cient solution) but depends on the location of the ¯rm which is the second closest
to the initial design. Apart from this fact, the problem is identical to the e±cient one in 1 and
the intuition of the results presented in the following Proposition is the same as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 The optimal design speci¯cation level ±C in the competitive case is increasing in
the number of the ¯rms N and the technological parameter ¯:
The following proposition presents the main result of the paper.
Proposition 4 The competitive speci¯cation level is less than the e±cient design speci¯cation
level, ±C < ±E. The di®erence between the e±cient solution and the competitive solution converges
to 0 as the number of ¯rms goes to in¯nity
As was remarked above, the sponsor's problem would be equivalent to the social planner's
problem if in the latter we considered the second closest ¯rm instead of the closest ¯rm. Using
this fact, it is easy to see the intuition of the proposition. From Proposition 1 we know that the
larger the number of ¯rms, the closer the winning ¯rm to the initial design, and the larger the
incentives to specify the initial design. Using the same argument, if we take the second closest
¯rm instead of the closest ¯rm, there should be less incentives to specify the initial design.
15This proposition shows an important trade-o® in design speci¯cation. Assume that the starting
point is the competitive solution. If the sponsor increases the level of speci¯cation the total
surplus of the procurement process goes up. This is due to the fact that the ¯nal design is closer
in expected terms to the optimal one and the winning ¯rm is the most likely to be the most
e±cient ¯rm to undertake the ¯nal design, ex-post. On the other hand, the increase in design
speci¯cation also increases the rents of the winning ¯rm, and this e®ect turns out to compensate
the ¯rst one.14 Another way to see the intuition behind the result is that by reducing design
speci¯cation, the comparative advantage of the closest ¯rm in the awarding process decreases. In
other words, the sponsor underinvests in the initial speci¯cation of the project to make potential
contractors more homogeneous, with the underlying goal to intensify competition and reduce its
expected transfer.15
Finally, when the number of ¯rms goes to in¯nity, the rent of the closest ¯rm converges to
0 because the expected distance with the second closest ¯rm also converges to 0. In such case,
the sponsor's trade o® between reducing the ¯rm rents and increasing the procurement surplus is
eliminated as can be seen from the fact that Ed1fS(d1;±)g ¡ Ed2fS(d2;±)g goes to 0.
14Observe that in the realistic case in which a procurement agent manages the procurement process on behalf of a
procurement principal, the renegotiation of the initial design can create room for collusion between the procurement
agent and the awarded contractor. While we leave this case for future research, we conjecture that collusion increases
the principal's incentives to specify the initial design and design misspeci¯cation would turn out to be lower than
in the case we discuss in this paper.
15We start the paper with a quote from Oscar Wilde, in which he points out that the auctioneers are reluctant
to provide good information about the goods they are selling. This observation can be explained using a similar
argument to ours. Assume that an auctioneer wants to sell a good using a second price auction. There are two risk
neutral bidders. Each bidder likes the good with probability
1
2 (his valuation is high VH) and with probability
1
2
he does not like the good (his valuation is low VL). Given the public information, they have a common expected
valuation 1
2VH + 1
2VL. If the auctioneer discloses new information about the good, they learn their exact valuation,
so they could have di®erent valuations VH or VL. If the auctioneer discloses additional information about the good,




4VL; the allocation of the good is e±cient (the bidder with the highest
valuation gets the good), and there are bidders' rents. If the auctioneer does not disclose any information about




2VL; the bidder with the lowest valuation can get the
good and there are no bidders' rents. As in our model, the lack of information about the good leads to ¯ercer
competition between bidders although can produce ine±cient allocations.
164.4 Cost overruns
In the introduction we mentioned the relationship existing between design misspeci¯cation and
cost overruns. This subsection is devoted to formalize this relationship. Usually cost overruns are
de¯ned as the di®erence between the procurement price and the ¯nal price:
CCO = pF ¡ pp = C1(dC) ¡ C1(b d) + ®(¼S +¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F):
The next result derives the relationship between expected cost overruns and the initial design
speci¯cation.
Proposition 5 Expected cost overruns of the project are decreasing in the design speci¯cation
level, ±
In other words, since cost overruns are due to reforms of the initial design, the better the
initial design, the fewer reforms of the design will be needed and this implies lower expected cost
overruns. An immediate Corollary characterizes the important relationship between competition
and cost overruns.
Corollary 2 Expected cost overruns of the project are decreasing in the number of the ¯rms N.
In other words, the more competitive the procurement market, the lower expected cost over-
runs will be. This might be an important result since it shows that any policy devoted to promote
competition in the procurement market, may have the positive e®ect of reducing cost overruns.
4.5 Endogenous market supply
In this section we report the consequences of introducing an endogenous market supply in the
model. That is, instead of assuming a ¯xed number of ¯rms, we introduce a new stage in the
game in which ¯rms decide whether to enter into the market (paying a ¯xed cost) or not.
The result of this extension is quite surprising, as endogenizing the number of ¯rms in the
market might lead to multiplicity of equilibria with the following intuition. Firms decide to enter
17into the market when their expected pro¯ts at least compensate the entry cost. On the other
hand, expected pro¯ts of any one ¯rm depend positively on the speci¯cation level of the design.
Yet we know that the speci¯cation level of the design depends positively on the number of ¯rms.
Therefore, there may exist equilibria, with few ¯rms, low expected pro¯ts, and a low speci¯cation
level and equilibria with many ¯rms, high expected pro¯t and a high level of design speci¯cation.
This multiplicity of equilibria may be a source of ine±ciency since, from the point of view of
the sponsor, it is always better to have many ¯rms. Yet, due to a coordination failure, he may be
stuck with a narrow market and a high level of cost overruns.
5 Imperfect Information
In this section we brie°y consider the case in which ¯rms cannot observe the level of design
speci¯cation. The timing and structure of the game are the same as in the previous section.
1. The sponsor, knowing the number of ¯rms in the market, N, decides his expenditures on
research, ±; and speci¯es an initial design b d for the project. The ¯rms can not observe ± but
they have a common expectation ±0 over it.
2. The sponsor announces the initial design. Firms learn their location (with respect to b d) and
given their expectations, present their bids to the sponsor. The sponsor awards the public
project to the ¯rm that maximizes his expected utility considering the ¯rm's bid and its
location technology.
3. The winning ¯rm and the sponsor learn the optimal design d¤ and, through a Nash bargain-
ing procedure, decide the ¯nal design and the ¯nal price to be paid for the project.
We solve the model using backwards induction.
185.1 Renegotiation of the initial design
The renegotiation process between the sponsor and the winning ¯rm has the same solution
that in the previous game (when the awarded contractor learns d¤ the speci¯cation level does not
play any role). Therefore, given the optimal design d¤ and the winning ¯rm dw, the ¯nal design






p + ¯(dII ¡dw)2 ¡ ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
+®
³
¡(dII ¡ d¤)2 + (b d ¡ d¤)2 ¡ ¯(dII ¡ dw)2 + ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
´
:
As a consequence, the focus is on the procurement stage and the design speci¯cation problem.
5.2 Price competition
The procurement proceeds as in the previous section. In order to solve the problem we have
assumed that the ¯rms have common expectation regarding the project's speci¯cation level ±0.
Given this expectation, we obtain similar results to those in the previous section: the closest ¯rm
to the initial design wins the auction dw = d1, the procurement price will be
pII
p = C1(b d) ¡ Ed¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡½F)j±0g + S(d1;±0) ¡ S(d2;±0):
5.3 Initial design optimal speci¯cation
Given the above, the sponsor's ex ante payo® is
Ed1;d2;d¤fUSg = Ed1;d2;d¤fV (dII) ¡ pII
F ¡ ±g:
and substituting the ¯nal price we get
Ed1;d2;d¤fUSg = Ed1;d2;d¤fV (dII) ¡C1(dII) ¡ ®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)g
+Ed1;d¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡½S ¡ ½F)j±0g +Ed1;d2f¡S(d1;±0) + S(d2;±0)g ¡ ±:
19Notice that, when unobserved, the speci¯cation level chosen by the sponsor cannot a®ect ¯rms'
expectation ±0 so that the term
Ed1;d¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)j±0g + Ed1;d2f¡S(d1;±0) + S(d2;±0)g
does not depend on ±. Given this the sponsor's problem is equivalent to the following problem
±II 2 argmax
±
Ed1fS(d1;±)g ¡ Ed1;d¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)g ¡ ±
and we have the following result.
Proposition 6 If the winning ¯rm has some bargaining power ® > 0, the competitive speci¯cation
level with imperfect information is higher than the e±cient design speci¯cation level ±II > ±E: If
the sponsor has all the bargaining power ® = 0, in the ex post renegotiation of the contract, then
the solution is the e±cient solution.
Observe that the sponsor knows that ¯rms discounts design renegotiation rents in their bids
but is unable to a®ect these discounts. For this reason, he tries to reduce ¯rms' ex post rents
by overinvesting in design speci¯cation. The higher the investment in design's speci¯cation, the
lower the rents of the winning ¯rm during the renegotiation process.
In order to calculate the sponsor's total surplus note that the sponsor has a dominant strategy
±II given that he can not a®ect ¯rms' expectations. Although this is not important to derive
the equilibrium design speci¯cation level (as ±II turns out to be a dominant strategy, given the
continuation game) in a Nash equilibrium ¯rms correctly forecast the sponsor's strategy, so that
±0 = ±II. Using this fact, the next corollary shows that the sponsor is worse o® than in the case
in which ¯rms can observe the design speci¯cation level.
Corollary 3 Under unobservability of design speci¯cation level, the Nash equilibrium payo® for
the sponsor is
US = Ed2fS(d2;±II) ¡ ±IIg
and is lower than the Nash equilibrium payo® of the case with observable design speci¯cation level
20Corollary 3 provides a reasonable result. When comparing a Stackelberg game (the case in
which ¯rms can observe ±) with the case in which ¯rms cannot observe such ±, the sponsor's pro¯ts
are larger in the former case. An important implication of this corollary is that the sponsor has
incentives to make the speci¯cation level observable. In the case of public works there are two
ways in which the sponsor can make ± observable:
² The sponsor can commit to an observable design speci¯cation by delegating an independent
¯rm the task of specifying the initial design.
² Given information on the value of ± can be inferred ex-post, a sponsor that cares about
future payo®s may want to establish a reputation for underinvesting in the speci¯cation of
the initial design to intensify competition among contractors.
6 Conclusions
Since public procurement accounts for a signi¯cant fraction of economic activity and since it
is not unusual that public project end up with a ¯nal cost several times higher than the initial
estimates, cost overruns are a very important issue for economists, politicians and the public.
The ¯rst goal of this paper was to provide an explanation for cost overruns in public pro-
curement. We have developed a model in which cost overruns arise as a consequence of the
renegotiation of an initial contract. Given existing uncertainty on the project's optimal design,
the sponsor can devote resources to provide an initial estimate. Since this is costly, the sponsor is
likely to provide a description of the project that, while an unbiased estimate of the optimal loca-
tion will di®er from it in all probability. Given this, as the project's optimal location is learned in
the realization stage, the awarded contractor and the sponsor are likely to have strong incentives
to engage in a bilateral renegotiation to modify the initial design of the project. Cost overruns
arise as a consequence of this design renegotiation.
Our results show that in equilibrium the sponsor has incentives to invest less in the design's
speci¯cation than would be e±cient (keeping into account only the cost of the initial design speci-
21¯cation). The intuition of the result is that by reducing design speci¯cation, the sponsor promotes
¯ercer competition among contractors: Lowering the initial design speci¯cation, homogenizes hori-
zontally di®erentiated potential contractors and in particular decreases the comparative advantage
of the most e±cient ¯rm.
This paper sheds light on one trade o® in public procurement. While a more accurate spec-
i¯cation of an initial design increases the probability to award the project to the most e±cient
¯rm, it also increases the rents of the latter. Since under perfect competition there no design
misspeci¯cation takes place (as rents are eliminated) the above mentioned trade o® disappears
and the initial design speci¯cation is the e±cient one. Given this cost overruns can be seem as a
consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market and we can conclude that public
policies promoting competition in procurement markets are also likely to reduce cost overruns in
public works.
A Appendix
As a convention and without loss of generality we are going to consider in the appendix that
b d = 0 and di;d1;d2 2 [0; 1
2]. We need to state some preliminary facts before we start with the
proofs of the results.
Let Gd1(d;N) and Gdi(d;N) be the distributions of the expected distance between the ini-
tial design b d and the closest ¯rm d1 and the ¯rm which is the ¯rm i closest to b d, respectively.
These distributions do not depend on the initial design and it can be shown that
@Gd1(d;N)
@N < 0
8d 2 (0; 1
2). These distributions are ordered in a strict ¯rst order stochastic dominance sense,
Gd1(d;N) > Gdi(d;N), for all d 2 (0; 1
2):
Proof of lemma 1: The expected surplus of an arbitrary ¯rm di given that the initial design is
b d = 0 and the speci¯cation level is ±; is
S(di;±) = Ed¤fV (dE) ¡ Ci(dE)j±g
= Ed¤fV ¡ C ¡ (dE ¡ d¤)2 ¡ ¯(dE ¡ di)2j±g:
22By plugging dE =
¯di+d¤
1+¯ into the expression and then factorizing, we get




Since d¤ is distributed on [¡1
2; 1
2] according to F(dj±); this expectation is







minf(di ¡ s)2;(1 ¡jdi ¡ sj)2gf(sj±)ds:
Notice that, due to the fact that the design space is a circle, there are two distances between di
and d¤ and we have to consider only the shortest length arc.



























(1 ¡ di + s)2f(sj±)ds:
By using the symmetry of F(dj±) we get














((di ¡ s)2 + (1 ¡ di ¡ s)2)f(sj±)ds














(1 ¡ 2(di + s))f(sj±)ds:
Integrating by parts the second term we get

















It is interesting to see the special cases ± = 0 and ± = 1. We have that







If there is no investment in design speci¯cation, the expected surplus does not depend on the
location of the ¯rm. On the other hand





when the initial design is the optimal one, case ± = 1, the expected surplus only depends on the













23By using that F(1
2 ¡dij±) is increasing in ±; and
@S(di;0)
@di = 0; we can conclude that given the ¯rm's
location di, this expression is negative for ± > 0: Then the surplus is decreasing in the distance
between the initial design and the ¯rm's location.
Proof of lemma 2: The expected procurement surplus, given that the winning ¯rm is the closest
¯rm to the initial design, is




Therefore, to prove the lemma we have to show that Ed¤;d1f( d¤¡d1)2j±g is decreasing on ±: First,
we analyze the sum of the expected quadratic distance between the optimal design and all the
¯rms. Let Ai be the expected quadratic distance between the optimal design and the ¯rms which
is ¯rm i closest to the initial design.
N X
i=1
Ai = Ed¤;d1f(d¤ ¡ d1)2j±g
+Ed¤;d2f(d¤ ¡ d2)2j±g + ¢¢¢ +Ed¤;dNf(d¤ ¡ dN)2j±g:
Rearranging terms we get
N X
i=1




It is clear that this sum does not depend on ± since the relative position of the ¯rms is not
important when we are adding all the distances. Therefore, the derivative of this sum respect to










The next step is to show that @Ai¡A1
@± > 0 for every i 6= 1 . Using similar computations to
those in the proof of Lemma 1 we get16














Ai ¡ A1 =
"Ã























16Notice, that dX and d
o are independent variables, and we do not need to specify the joint distribution.











(Gdi(z;N) ¡ Gd1(z;N))dz > 0:
Since
@F(sj±)
@± > 0 and Gd1(z;N) > Gdi(z;N) 8z 2 (0; 1
2). But given that the derivative of the sum
is 0, and given that
@(Ai¡A1)
@± > 0 for every i 6= 1; this implies that @A1
@± < 0, which concludes the
proof.
Proof of proposition 1: We are going to use a result of Edlin and Shannon (1998), that allows
us to obtain strictly monotonic static comparative results without making assumptions on the
concavity of the distribution functions.
Theorem 1 (Edlin and Shannon (1998)) Let S ½ <; f : <£< ! <; x¤ 2 argmaxx2S f(x;t¤)
and x0 2 argmaxx2S f(x;t0): Suppose that f is C1 and has increasing marginal returns, and that
x¤ 2 int S . Then x0 > x¤ if t0 > t¤, and x0 < x¤ if t0 < t¤:
























£ gd1(z;N)dz ¡ ±:





















£ gd1(z;N)dz ¡ ±:
Where, x = ±;t = N;and S = <+ [ 0: Therefore the only condition that we have to check is that
f(x;t) has increasing marginal returns, so that
@f
@t is increasing in t:
To verify this condition, we compute the cross derivative
@2f
@N@±. First, from di®erentiating















































@± > 0 and
@Gd1(z;N)
@N > 0 we get that the whole expresion is positive, and f(±;N)
has increasing marginal returns. Therefore, applying Theorem 1, we conclude that the optimal
design speci¯cation level ±E is increasing in the number of ¯rms N:














































is negative. Then, applying theorem 1, we conclude that the optimal design speci¯cation level ±E
is increasing in the technological parameter ¯.
Proof of lemma 3: The bargaining problem between the winning ¯rm and the sponsor is
max
dC;pF
(¡(dC ¡ d¤)2 ¡ pF + (b d ¡ d¤)2 + pp)®
³
pF ¡ ¯(dC ¡ dw)2 ¡ pp + ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
´1¡®
:
From totally di®erentiating with respect to dC and pF we get the two ¯rst order conditions. After
simplifying we get








pF ¡ ¯(dC ¡ dw)2 ¡ pp + ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
´
:




pF = pp + ¯(dC ¡ dw)2 ¡ ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
+®
³
¡(dC ¡ d¤)2 + (b d ¡d¤)2 ¡ ¯(dC ¡ dw)2 + ¯(b d ¡ dw)2
´
:
26which concludes the proof.
Proof of lemma 4: First, we recall two previous results that we will use for the proof. By
Lemma 3 we know that the negotiation is e±cient and that given ± and the winning ¯rm, the
competitive mechanism produces the same surplus as in the e±cient solution. By Lemma 1 we
know that given ± > 0 the closest ¯rm is the ¯rm that produces the largest expected surplus.
Second we are going to normalize the bids in the auction. Assume that the bids are
bi = Ci(b d) ¡ Ed¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)j±g + ¼i:
With this normalization, we can see that ¼i is the expected pro¯t of the ¯rm i when it presents
the bid bi. Using this normalization, when the sponsor grants the project to ¯rm i his expected
surplus is
US = S(di;±) ¡ ¼i ¡ ±:
Suppose that the ¯rm dj 6= d1 is winning the project. Since, by individual rationality ¼j ¸ 0 , the
sponsor surplus must be lower than or equal to S(dj;±) ¡ ±: But, in this case the closest ¯rm dI
can o®er a better bid, with a pro¯t ¼1 = S(d1;±) ¡ S(dj;±) ¡ ², with ² > 0. The sponsor obtains
a higher surplus with this o®er (S(dj;±) ¡ ± + ²) and the closest ¯rm obtains positive pro¯ts.
Therefore, the winning ¯rm must be the closest ¯rm to the initial design dw = d1.
Using the same argument, we conclude that the procurement price must be
b1 = C1(b d) ¡ Ed¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡½F)j±g + S(d1;±) ¡ S(d2;±)
It is easy to check that the closest ¯rm can not increase this o®er. This is because the second
closest ¯rm could get the project with a bid equal to b2 = C2( b d)¡Ed¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)j±g.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Lemma 3 we know the expected pro¯t of the winning ¯rm is
the di®erence between the expected surplus with its location and the expected surplus with the
location of the second closest ¯rm to the initial design:






























































This expression is positive, since by Assumption 3
@F(1
2¡zj±)
@± > 0, and Gd1(z;N) > Gd2(z;N) for
all z 2 (0; 1
2):
Proof of Proposition 3: We follow the same argument that we have used in the proof of
Proposition 1.




This problem is equivalent to
±C 2 argmax
±
Ed1;d2fS(d1;±) ¡ ¦(±) ¡ ±g
Where ¦(±) = Ed1fS(d1;±)g¡Ed2fS(d2;±)g is the expected pro¯t of the winning ¯rm. By Lemma
2 we know that
@¦(±)
@± > 0. In order to show the result we will show that ±C > ±E and ±C = ±E
are not possible.
² Case 1: ±C > ±E. This is not possible, since in this case ±E provides more surplus to the
sponsor than ±C:
Ed2;d1fS(d1;±E) ¡ ¦(±E) ¡ ±Eg > Ed2;d1fS(d1;±C) ¡ ¦(±C) ¡ ±Cg
This inequality follows from ±E 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1;±) ¡ ±gg and ¦( ±E) < ¦( ±C).
² Case 2: ±C = ±E. It is not possible since ±E 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1;±) ¡ ±gg and
@¦(±)
@± > 0
implies than ±C = ±E cannot satis¯es the ¯rst order condition of the problem.
28Proof of proposition 5: The expected cost overruns are
CCO = Ed1;d¤fC1(dC) ¡ C1(b d) + ®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡½F)j±g
Since C1( b d) does not depend on ±; in order to show that the cost overruns are decreasing in ±;
we only need to show that Ed1;d¤fC1(dC)j±g and Ed1;d¤f®(¼S +¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)j±g are decreasing
in ±:
By plugging the expression of the optimal design dC =
¯d1+d¤
(1+¯ into Ed1;d¤fC1(dC)j±g, and then
factorizing, we get
Ed1;d¤fC1(dC)j±g = Ed1;d¤fC + ¯(dC ¡ d1)2j±g = E
d1;d¤fC +
¯
(1 + ¯)2(d¤ ¡ d1)2j±g:
Therefore we need to show that Ed1;d¤f( d¤ ¡ d1)2j±g is decreasing on ±: But this was proved in
the proof of Lemma 2.
We denote by R(±) the rent of the awarded ¯rm in the renegotiation of the design.
R(±) = Ed1;d¤f®(¼S + ¼F ¡ ½S ¡ ½F)j±g
R(±) = Ed1;d¤f®
³
¡(dC ¡ d¤)2 +(b d ¡ d¤)2 ¡ ¯(dC ¡ d1)2 + ¯(b d ¡ d1)2
´
j±g




(d¤ ¡ d1)2j±g + Ed1f®¯(b d ¡ d1)2g + Ed¤f®(b d ¡ d¤)2j±g




















































the variance of d¤. The second term is decreasing in ±, since by assumption 3 F(dj±) is increasing
in ±, 8d 2 [ b d; b d+ 1
2]: Finally, the third and fourth terms do not depend on ±: The whole argument
implies that R(±) is decreasing on ± and this concludes the proof.
Proof of corollary 2: Immediate from propositions 3 and 5.
Proof of proposition 6: By the same argument of the proof of Proposition 1, given that
±E 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1;±) ¡ ±gg and ±II 2 argmaxfEd1;d¤fS(d1;±) ¡ ± ¡ R(±)gg; in order to
prove ±E < ±II , we only need to show that R(±) is decreasing in ±. But this was proven in
Proposition 5.
Proof of corollary 3: Notice that
Ed2;d¤fS(d2;±C) ¡ ±Cg > Ed2;d¤fS(d2;±II) ¡ ±IIg
is immediate because ±C 2 argmaxfEd2;d¤fS(d2;±)¡±gg; and ±C 6= ±II ( ±E ￿ ±II and ±E > ±C).
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Figure 1: Two arbitrary density functions of e where ± > ±0:
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